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RECENT CASES
rrr= or CAsHr DEmosiT BE Rzmrran ow GRoun or
BAII--CAx Fo
INFAucY-In accordance with the provisions of a Pennsylvania statute,' allowing the deposit of cash bail in lieu of a bail bond, the petitioner, an infant,
deposited five hundred dollars on behalf of a third person. The defendant
having failed to appear for trial, the bail was forfeited, and the petitioner
sought to have the forfeiture remitted on the ground of his infancy. Held,
that the remission could not be granted. Conmonwealh v. Harris, 11 Pa.
D. & C. 2 (1928).
The policy of the law has always been to guard the property of infants3
from dissipation through the improvidence and lack of judgment of its owners
The general rule laid down is that all transactions of an infant, except those
3
involving necessaries, are voidable The effect of disaffirmance by the infant
is to render the transaction void ab hiitlo,' and, by the weight of authority, he
may recover his property even though he is unable to make restitution of the
consideration which he received. 5 The courts have even gone so far as to
hold that an infant may revoke a gift of tangible property, although accompanied by manual delivery The obligation of an infant surety is not binding
upon him," although it has been decided, on other grounds, that an infant is
It would seem that
bound by a recognizance executed for his own release
the principal case is at variance with the general rule. The court supports
its decision upon three grounds: that the assumption of a contractual relation
is dispensed with under this statute, and hence the cases dealing with infants'
contracts are inapplicable; that it is a well-established rule of construction
in Pennsylvania that when a statute confers authority generally, it applies to
1
Acr or MAncH ig, 1925, P. L. 49, PA. STAT. (WEST, 1928) §8083a-I,
amending the Acr or MAY 12, 1927, P. L. 548.
-See Hudson v. Hudson, 16o Ky. 432, 438, 169 S. W. 891, 893 (1914);
Horton v. McCoy, 47 N. Y. 2, :26 (1871); Harner v. Dipple, 31 Ohio St. 7;,
73 (1876).
See Walker v. Arkansas Nat. Bank, 256 Fed. i, 5 (C. C. A. 8th, i919);
Frank Spangler Co. v. Haupt, 53 Pa. Sup. 545, 549 (z93); Person v. Chase,
37 Vt. 647, 648 (z865).
'Mette v. Feltgen, 748 Ill. 357, 36 N. E. 81 (1894); French v. McAn61 Miss. 187 (883).
drews,
3
5Bluejacket v. Ewert :265 Fed. 823 (C. C. A. 8th, 92) ; Walsh v. Young,
110 Mass. 396 (z872); Oneonta Grocery Co. v. Preston, 167 N. Y. Supp.
641 (1917); WooDvwA, LAw oF QUASI CoNTRcrs (z93) § 69; 72 U.
or PA. L. REv. 195 (1924).
'Holt v. Holt, 59 Me. 464 (87) ; Person v. Chase, snpra note .
"Maples v. Wightman, 4 Conn. 376 (1822); State v. Satterwhite, no S.
C. 536 (883); see Owen v. Long, 112 Mass. 403, 404 (873).
'Weatherwax v. State, I7 Kan. 427 (1874); McCall v. Parker, 13 Met(.
372 (Mass. 1847) ; Fagin v. Goggin, 72 R. 1. 398 (7879). These decisions generally rest either upon statute or upon the theory that an infant's recognizance,
executed to procure his own release, may be classed as a necessary.
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everyone, regardless of disabilities, unless expressly excepted; ' and that the legislature can not be presumed to have intended that cash bail be returned under
these circumstances, since the ends of justice would be thereby defeated.
The conclusion reached by the court is undoubtedly sound, but it is submitted that the court was mistaken in stating that the statute dispensed
with the contractual relation between the bail and the state. By analogy to
a pledge" the relation established appears to be essentially a contractual
one. The bail deposits a sum of money with the court to secure the performance of the defendant's obligation to appear for trial. However, under
the Pennsylvania rule, the absence of any mention of disabilities in the
statute unquestionably justifies the construction which the court put upon
it.'
It is within the province of the legislature to impose certain obligations
upon infants. = There are several obligations which, because of public policy
or implications drawn from statutes, are binding upon infantse and the public
welfare would seem to require that this obligation be placed in that class.

BANxs AND BANiCI---GNERtr., SPacAx. AND SPECIC DrosiTs DisTrNGuis E--The agent of the plaintiff opened an account with the defendant
bank in pursuance of a written agreement that the deposits of money were
the property of the plaintiff, for safe-keeping only, and not made for the
purposes of establishing commercial credit. The privilege was retained of
withdrawing 1he entire account monthly. The deposits were freely commingled
with other funds of the bank, but an amount in excess of the balance remained
in the vaults until the bank's subsequent insolvency. The plaintiff seeks to
compel classification of a balance in his favor as a trust fund. Held (one
9
Warfield v. Fox, 53 Pa. 38z (1866): ". . . if infants and femes
covert were intended to be excepted, it is incomprehensible that the exception
was not expressly made. A saving from the opration of statutes for disabilities must be expressed, or it does not exist. . . . A law general in
its nature binds minors and feines covert, and there is a multitude of statutes
by which the rights of such persons are affected, though they are not specifically named." Hunt v. Wall, 75 Pa. 413 (1874).
" "A pledge is a bailment to secure the performance of some debt or obligation due the pledgee, though not necessarily owing by the pledgor, since the
pledge may be made to secure the performance of an obligation of third person."
2 WnUSTON, CoNRAcrs (1920) § 1o42.
'In Williams v. Ivory, 173 Pa. 536, 34 AtI. 291 (1896), the court said:
"There is no limitation in the act which excludes persons under disabilities.
'Any person" means every person. . . . When therefore the act extends
its benefits to illpersons it must be held to confer capacity to make the necessary
deed of assignment by which alone those benefits can be obtained." Cf. O'Shanassy v. Joachim, 34 L. T. R. (N. s.) 265 (1876). See United States v. Bainbridge, z Mason 71, 81 (C. C. Mass. i816).
' Herkey v. Agar Mfg. Co., 9o Misc. 457, 153 X. Y. Supp. 369 (i915);
Scott v. Nashville Bridge Co., 143 Tenn. 86, 223 S. W. 844 (1920) ; see In re
Morrissey, 137 U. S. 157,_159,'11 Sup. Ct. 57 (i89o) ; Wassum v. Feeney, 121
Mass. 93, 95 (1876).
'aIn re Morrissey, supra note i (enlistment contract); Bordentown v
Wallace, 50 N. J. L. 13, xx At]. 267 (1887) (bond to support bastard child);
Cole v. Seeley, 25 Vt. 220 ('853) (debts of wife).
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justice dissenting), that the account was one of general deposit and not a
trust. Pacific States Ssa jgs & Low; Co. v. Comvercial State Bank et at.,,
269 Pac. 86 (Idaho 1928).
While in general accord that a general deposit is a loan to the bank, creating the relationship of debtor and creditor,' the courts have frequently failed
to perceive the distinction between special deposits and deposits for a specific
purpose.2 A special deposit is either a bailment: or, where the legal title
passes to the depository, a trust,' the depositor being entitled to the return of
the identical property deposited.' A deposit for a specific purpose is considered a trust by most courts," though by others as a debt with no greater
preference rights than a general deposit, but in all cases it conveys an authorization to the depository to act as agent with respect to the deposits
The expressed mutual intention governs the character of the deposit,' but
ordinarily a deposit is presumed to be general and the burden is upon the
claimant to prove otherwise. ' Commingled special deposits and, according to
'Thompson v. Riggs, 5 Wall. 663, (U. S. 1866); Fogg v. Tyler, 109
Me. io9, 82 Ad. zooS (191); Pittsburgh Nat. Bank of Commerce v. McMurray, 98 Pa. 538 (i88); City of Sturgis v. Meade County Bank, 38 S. D.
317 (917); I MORSE, BANKS AND BANKING, (6th ed. 1928) § 186. A certificate of deposit, standing alone, is mere evidence of indebtedness and a
general deposit z MoasE, op. cit. mipra §297; People v.. Calif. Safe Deposit
and Trust Co., 23 Cal. App. i99, x37 Pac. 1111 (1913). Cf. Stoller et at. v.
Coates, 88 Mo. 514 (1885). Nor is the keeping of separate accounts for one
depositor conclusive of an intention to have other than a general deposit.
Northern Sugar Co. v. Thompson 13 F. (2d) 829 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926). Interest paid the depositor is sound evidence of a general deposit. Ex parte
Broad, In -re Neck, 13 Q. B. D. 740 (1884); Tucker v. Linn, 57 Ad. 1017
(N. 2J. i9o4) ; Pittsburgh Nat. Bank v. McMurray, 9S Pa. 538 (1881).
Cf. Peak v. Elliot, 30 Kan. 156, i Pac. 499 (1883), with Blummer v.
Scandinavian Am. State Bank, i69 Minn. 89, 210 N. W. 865 (1926); and cf.
Hudspeth v. Union Trust and Savings Co., x96 Iowa 706, 195 N. W. 378 (x193)
with Stein v. Kemp, 122 Minn. 4, 155 N. W. iosz (1916). See Anderson
v. Pacific Bank, 112 Cal. 598, 44 Pac. 1o63 (1896).
'Fogg. v. Tyler, .supranote i; Bank of Blackwell v. Dean, Assignee, 9 Okla.
626 (igoo); Shoemaker v. Hinze, 53 Wis. z6 (88gi).
' Boettcher v. Colorado Nat. Bank, 15 Col. 16 (i89o).
rNVarren v. Nix, 97 Ark. 374, 135 S. W. 896 (1911); Gibson v. Erie,
196 Pa. 7 (igoo) ; Carlson v. Kies, 75 Wash. 17, 134 Pac. 8o8 (19o3) ; Fogg
v. Tyler, =pra note i.
'Peak v. Elliott; Stein v. Kemp, both mipra note 2; Dolph v. Cross, 153
Iowa 289, 133 N. W. 669 (1911); Ryan v. Phillips, 3 Kan. App. 7o4 (i896);
Carlson v. Kies, stepra note 5.
'Kuehne v. Union Trust Co., 163 Mich. 6o2, 95 N. W. 715 (1903); In re
Barned's Banking Co., z P. L R. 853, 18 W. R. 818 (i8yo) ; z MoRsE, op. cit.

supra § 21.

'This is frequently expressed as "furthering a transaction between the- depositor and a third person." Cases cited in note 2 supra; St. Louis v. Johnson, 21 Fed. Cas. 186, s Dill. 241 (i879); Montague v. Pacific Bank, 81 Fed.
6oz (1897) ; People v. City Bank of Rochester, g6 N. Y. 3 (1884).
'Fogg v. Tyler, supra note I.
"Northern Sugar Co. v. Thompson, supra note r, at 83r. MoRsE, op. cit.
supra § 186, and cases therein cited.
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a majority of jurisdictions,' deposits for specific purposes, the equitable titles
being in the depositors themselves, are classified as trust funds, and if traceable,? are entitled to a preference over general deposits. In the principal
case, the stipulations that the account was for safe-keeping only, and the
property of the plaintiff, together with the fact that no interest was paid by
the bank, are significant evidences of a special deposit. But safe-keeping
as the object of an account is a motive applicable to any kind of deposit'
and the further language above mentioned does not divulge that the identical
money deposited was intended to remain in the equitable ownership of plaintiff. The deposit was for the purpose of furthering a transaction between the
depositor and plaintiff. But the plaintiff, as the principal of the depositor,
had authorized the deposit, and is therefore not a third person within the purview of those cases which have established fiduciary relationships under like
circumstances.' The bank was not paid for handling the account, and it seems
extraordinary that a bank would consent to an account without intending to
derive a benefit therefrom, as by a right to use the money. 7 It is submitted
that the case is correctly decided, in that the evidence offered by plaintiff was
not sufficient to rebut the presumption of a general deposit.
CoNzEmPr-DisoBEnmxcE ov Couirr ORDER BFxoan FoRmAL SEuvimc-The
appellant having "tnowledgethat a court order to make certain payments as
executor had been issued against him, nevertheless disobeyed the same, for
which an attachment for contempt was issued. The appellant appealed, contending, inter alia,' that he was not in contempt because no formal notice of
. See cases cited notes 6 and 7 supra.
'Following In re Hallett, L. R. 13 Ch. Div. 696 (x879), many jurisdictions have denied the necessity of tracing beyond the money assets in the bank
at the time of its closing. Carlson v. Kies, supra note 5, and cases cited;
Boone County Nat. Bank v. Latimer, 67 Fed. 27 (W. D. Mo. 1895); Hansen
v. Roush, 139 Iowa 58, i6 N. W. io6i (1908); Widman v. Kellogg, 22
N. D. 396, 133 N. W. 1020 (igri) and cases cited. Contra: Commonwealth v.
Tradesmen's Trust Co. (No. 2) 250 Pa. 378 (iI5) ; It re North Penn Bank,
3o Dist. 245, 5o Pa. C. C. 3o8 (192i). Cf. case and note (x9o5) i L. R. A.
(N. s.) 252. See Bowers v. Evans, Assignee, etc. 71 Wis. 133 (i886) (liberal
view) ; ( gxs-i6) 64 U. oF PA. L. Rsv. 217.
" Fogg v. Tyler, smpra note i, at ii.5. Tucker v. Linn, supranote i.
"'Warren v. Nix, supra note 4; Miss. Cent. R. Co. v. Conner, 114 Miss.
63, 75 So. 57 (i917). But see Fogg v. Tyler, supra note i, at 114.
(so-called
' See Butcher v. Butler, 134 Mo. App. 61, 114 S. W. 564 (198o)
"trust fund account" held to be one of general deposit").
" Cases cited note 6 sup-a.
'7Miss. Cent. R. Co. v. Conner, supra note 14, at 71.
'To appellant's second contention that at the time of the entry of the
original awards and subsequent order to pay he was wholly unable to comply
therewith, owing to impecuniosity, the court said, "The mere answer of a
trustee that he has wrongfully wasted or otherwise stripped himself of the
trust fund may not stay the arm of a chancellor when the day for accounting
has arrived, else indeed would his decree be but an empty name, and breaches
of trust would become common by reason of their immunity from any dangerous consequences."
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the order had been served on him. Held, that he is in contempt. In Re Messmoore's Estate, 293 Pa. 63, 141 At. 724 (1928).
The instant case is of particular interest in that it crystallizes the law of
Pennsylvania, as regards personal service of order in contempt proceedings,
in conformity with the great weight of authority. Briefly, athough the decree
of the court has not been served, if one has actual knowledge of the order
he is generally held to be in contempt if he violates it, for the reason that
the law does not permit one who knowingly acts in contempt of its decrees, to
2
escape liability on a technicality. It is a matter of no moment how the
of its existence.3 When once he has been
information
the
acquired
defendant
apprised of the fact, he is legally bound to desist from doing what he is
restrained from doing. It seems to have been at one time the generally
recognized rule in Pennsylvania courts of first instance, that a party could not be
adjudged guilty of contempt for disobedience of a judicial order unless it was
shown that the order in question had been personally served upon him.' These
5
decisions, contrary to the weight of authority at that time, appear to have
been based upon the view that "one can only be in contempt by disobeng
some process or order of the court previously -served upon him." a The law,
More recent lower court dehowever, by degrees changed in this state
established by the Supreme
now
view
better
the
recognized
have
cisions'
Court in the principal case. A change such as the one outlined, however
late, is commendable. A different rule would enable an. unscrupulous person
to elude the justice of the court, in many cases, by doing the very thing enjoined, or intended to be enjoined, in anticipation of the service of the writ.

I RAPALJ E, CONTrpr (1887) 61; Ulman v. Ritter, 72 Fed. 1ooo (C. C. D.
W. V. 1896); Hull v. Thomas, 3 Edw. CIL 236 (N. Y. 1838); Farnsworth
v. Fowler, i Swan. i (Tenn. 1851); Cape May R. R. v. Johnson, 35 N. J.
Eq. 422 (1882); Skip v. Harwood, 3 Atk. 564 (Eng. 1747); Vansandau v.
Rose, 2 Jac. & W. 265 (Eng. 182o). Contra: Eliott v. Osborn, i Cal. 396
(1851).
'Hull v. Thomas, supra;note 2; Thebault v. Canova, 11 Fla. W43 (1866);
Cape May R. R. v. Johnson, mtPra note 2.
'Keating's Estate, I Woodw. (Pa. 1867); Pierce v. Post, 6 Phila. 494
(Pa. 1868) ; McKinney's Estate, 2 W. N. C. z56 (Pa. 1875) ; Killiam's Estate,
2 W. N. C. 684 (Pa. 1875); Chews' Estate, 3 W. N. C. 39z (Pa. 1877).
5
Hull v. Thomas; Farnsworth v. Fowler; Skip v. Harwood; Vansandau
v. Rose, all =pra note 2.
'Pierce v Post, .rpra note 4.
" Robb v.Pepper, ii W. N. C. 497 (Pa. x882) (Service within discretion
of court); Brighton v. Pittsburgh, zos Pa. z3 (1884); Douglas-Whistler v.
Simpson, 233 Pa. 517, 82 Atl. 760 (1912) [such previous notice as will afford
(the parties) an opportunity of being heard]; Sperry v. McKelvey, 64 Pa.
Super. 57 (1916) (those who know of the order guilty of contempt for
violation); Scranton v. People's Coal, 274 Pa. 631, 117 Ati. 673 (1922). [Liability exists where (parties) had actual notice (in the sense of "personal knowledge")].
"York Manuf. Co. v. Oberdick, ii Pa. Dist Rep. 616 (1902); Titusville Iron Co. v. Quinn, 13 Pa. Dist. Rep. 416 (9o3); Patterson & Co. v.
'Building Trades Council, 14 Pa. Dist. Rep. 843 (igos).
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CoaPoaRAroNs-BoND Issus-LiuiTATIoN OF INDE3T-EDNEss-REuNDNG
BoNDs--The defendant, a water supply corporation, proposed to sell an issue
of bonds, part of which was for development purposes, while the proceeds of
the remainder were to be placed in a sinking fund to retire previous bonds.
Complainants seeks to enjoin the defendant from disposing of the proposed
issue, (i) because the charter of the defendant will expire before the bonds
mature, and (2) because the refunding bonds will increase the indebtedness
of the defendant beyond the charter limit. Held, (i) that expiration of
charter before maturity is no objection to bond issue, and (2) that refunding bonds do not increase the corporate indebtedness. Citrus Fruit Growers' Developnent As=. v. Salt River Water Users' Assn., 268 Pac. 773 (Ariz.

1928).
In support of the first point, the court states that a corporation is not
bound only to make contracts which must be completed prior to the expiration of the corporate life, and that the dissolution of the defendant corporation is improbable because of its public purpose. That the obligation
of the defendant upon the bonds is actual might also be upheld on the decisions that the assets of a dissolved corporation become a trust fund for
1
In regard to the second point, the court folthe benefit of its creditors.
lows the apparent weight of authority in this country, although this view
upholds an evasion of the limitations placed upon corporate indebtedness.
When such a limitation 2 is imposed by constitution, statute, or articles of
incorporation, any obligation incurred in excess thereof would be ultra v res3
and grounds for granting an injunction, unless the limitation merely fixes
an amount of indebtedness which the officers may not exceed without making
themselves liable for the excess. In any case, when the limit has been reached,
new obligations may be directly exchanged for existing debts without exceeding the limitation fixed, for such a transaction merely changes the form
of the existing debts.' A divergence of opinion results when the proceeds

'See Wood v. Dumner, 30 Mason 3o8, 311, 312 (C. C. Me. 1824) ; McClaren v. Roller Mill Co., 95 Tenn. 696, 698, 699, 35 S. W. 88, 89 (1895);
Arlington Hotel Co. v. Rector, 124 Ark. 90, 104, 186 S. W. 622, 627 (1916). The
doubtful common law rule that upon dissolution the debts of a corporation are
extinguished is no longer recognized in the United States. See Huber v. Martin,
127 2Wis. 4I, 435, io5 N. W. 1031, 1035 (1906).
In Penna., limitation of indebtedness to a certain per cenum. of capital
stock means paid up stock. Commonwealth v. Lehigh Ave. Ry. Co., 129
Pa. 405, i8 AtI. 414 (1889).
'First Nat. Bank of Covington v. Kiefer Milling Co., 95 Ky. 97, 23
S. W. 675 (I8§3) ; Kraniger v. Peoples Building Society, 6 Minn. 94 (895) ;
cf. Grand Valley Water Users' Assn. v. Zumbrurn, 272 Fed. 943 (C. C. A.
8th, 192); Sherman Center Town Co. v. Morris, 43 Kar. 282, 23 Pac. 569

(1890).

"Ossipee Hosiery & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. Canney, 54 N. H. 295 (1874);
Sells & Co. v. Rosendale Grocery Co., 72 Miss. 590, 17 So. 236 (1895); Hawke
v. Cal. Realty Co., 28 Cal: App. 377, 152 Pac. 959 (1915).
'City of Mitchell v. Smith, 12 S. D. 24i, 8o N. W. 1077 (1899) ; Wrightsville Hardware Co. v. McElroy, 254 Pa. 422, 54 At. 191 (i916); Parsons v.
Rinard Grain Co., 186 Iowa io17, 173 N. W. 276 (1gg); see Birkholz v.
Dinnie, 6 N. D. sii, 516, 72 N. W. 931, 932 (1897).
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of the new obligations are to be applied to the payment of the existing
debts at a subsequent date. The majority of jurisdictions follow the view of
the court in the instant case, that the indebtedness is not thereby increased
so as to exceed the limitation.8 The minority hold that the indebtedness is
increased by the new obligation, which is ultra vires should it exceed the limitation. The latter view seems preferable in that, before the proceeds of
the refunding bonds are applied to the satisfaction of the previous debts,
an actual increase in indebtedness exceeding the limitation exists. The letter
and spirit of the law being thereby broken, it matters not that the increase
is only temporary, that the financial standing of the corporation has not
been impaired, or that the law presumes the proceeds will be applied to
the previous debts, the reasons generally given to support the majority view
that the result, practically and legally, is the same as though a direct exchange
of obligations had taken place.

Co RATi0ToNs-STocx SUtscam 0oNs-TAmKG NOTEs IN PAv-mxT--The
Delaware Constitution provides' that "no corporation shall issue stock, except
for money paid, labor done, or personal property . . . actually acquired."
A Delaware corporation issued some shares of stock, accepting in consideration the subscriber's promissory note secured by shares of stock in another
corporation. The maker of the note became insolvent, and the collateral proved
to have been without value at the time the note was given. A stockholder's
bill was filed praying cancellation of the stock so issued. Hfeld, that the note
without proper collateral security was not "property actually acquired," and
the stock, having been therefore illegally issued, should be cancelled. Sohland
v. Baker, 141 Atl. :277 (Del. 1927).
Constitutional or statutory provisions similar to that in Delaware exist
in many states. Under such provisions the question has arisen whether or not
the promissory note of a subscriber is acceptable by the corporation as "property actually acquired." The decided cases indicate that a note properly secured
will satisfy the statutory requirement.2 But in regard to an unsecured promissory note the authorities are not in entire accord. Some cases hold that
such a note, while, in one aspect, a mere promise to pay, is also a chose in
aPowell v. Blair, 133 Pa. 550, 19 At. 559 (189o) ; City of Poughkeepsie v.
275, 32 N. E. 764 (1892) ; Snyder v. Kantner, I9o Pa. 440,
2 At. 884 (i8f9); National Life Ins. Co. v. Mead, x3 S. D. 37, 82 N.
W. 78 (i9oo) ; Veatch v. Moscow, I8 Idaho 313, 1o9 Pac. 722 (I9o).
'Doon Township v. Cummins, 142 U. S. 366 (1892) (one dissent), criticized
in Huron v. Second Ward Say. Bank, 86 Fed. 272, 279 (C. C..A. 8th, 1898) ;
Anderson v. Orient Fire Ins. Co., 88 Iowa 579, 55 N. W. 348 (893) ; State v.
McGraw, 12 Wash. 541, 41 Pac. 893 (i895) (one dissent) ; Birkholz v. Dinnie,
supra note 5.

untard, 136 N. Y.

Constitution of i897, art. 9, § 3.
Clark v. Lexington, 24 Ky. 1755, 72 S. W. 286 (1903) ; Ham v. Smith,
Ss Okla. 137, 204 Pac. 642 (iga2) ; General Bonding Co. v. Moseley, mo Tex.
529, 222 S. W. 961 (1920); Prudential Life Ins. Co. v. Pearson, 222 S. W.
967 (Tex. ig2o).
2
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action, and may therefore be received as property. Others hold that although a note is property in the larger sense of the word, -it does not
come within the intended meaning of the term "property actually acquired."'
In view of the purpose of the provision-to prevent, as a matter of public
policy, the "fictitious" issuing of corporate stock -- this latter holding seems
the preferable one. The cases expressing the contrary doctrine may have been
somewhat influenced, as suggested in the principal case,' by the fact that they
all involved suits against individual stockholders who were attempting to employ the statute to evade liability upon notes which had been voluntarily given
in payment for stock. But such a situation has been effectively disposed of
by those courts in accord with the Delaware decision by recognizing that
the issuing of the stock is illegal, yet making such a defense unavailable to
the subscriber on the theory that to allow it would work a legal wrong.7
DEEns-WArv-R oF BimACH OF CownrroNr SunsEQusxr-The common
grantor conveyed lots in fee to the defendant and others with the provision that
if the land was used for oil prospecting, title should revert to itself. Thereafter, the common grantor leased other portions of the same tract, including
lot adjoining defendant's, for oil drilling, and, upon breach of the condition
subsequent by the defendant, the common grantor conveyed by quitclaim deed to
the plaintiff its reversionary interest in defendant's lot. Held, that the plaintiff
is not entitled to forfeiture. Wilshire Oil Co. v. Star Petroleum Co. et a.,
269 Pac. 722 (Cal. 1928).
That a breach of such a condition may be waived by parol, even though
IPacific Trust Co. v. Dorsey, 72 Cal. 55, 12 Fac. 49 (x887), aff'd, Quartz
Glass & Mfg. Co. v. Joyce, 27 Cal. App. 523, i5o Pac. 648 (1915) ; Newhall v.

Hunsaker, s8 Cal. App. 399, 176 Pac. 38o (z9r8); Meholin v. Carlson, 17
Idaho 742, io7 Pac. 755 (igxo); German Mercantile Co. v. Wanner, 25 N. D.
479, 142 N. W. 463 (1913), aff'd, Baird v. Kilene, 53 N. D. 244, 205 N. W.
681 (1925); Shiller Piano Co. v. Hyde, 39 S. D. 74, 162 N. W. 937 (1917).
' Teehan v.U. S., 25 F. (2d) 884 (D. C. Mass. 1928) ; Bank v. Goolsby,
129 Ark. 416, 196 S. W. 803 (1917) ; CahalI v. Lofiand, i2 Del, Ch. 299, 114

Atl. 224 (i921);First Nat. Bank v. Cornell, 8 App. Div. 427, 40 N. Y.
Supp. 850 (i896); Southwestern Tank Co. v. Morrow, 115 Okla. 97, 241 Pac.
I097 (Igz5) ; McCarthy v. Texas Loan Co., 1, S. W. 96 (Tex. 1912) ; Washer
v. Smryer, iog Tex. 398, 211 S. W. 985 (9'9),
ard,Western Nat Bank v.
Spencer, 112 Te. 49, 244 S. W. 123 (1922).
ISee Bank v. Goolsby, mpra note 4 at 432; Ettinger v. Collins, 25 Ariz. 1iS,
12o, 2x3 Pac. 102, 1004 (1923) ; Gearhart v. Standard Co., 223 Pa. 385, 387, 72
At. 699, 700 (1o99) ; CooIC, CORPORAIONS (6th ed. 29o8) § '99.

'At 28s.
Finnell v. Sanford, 17 Ky. 748 (1856) ; Jeffrey v. Selwyn, 22o N. Y. 77,
1I5 N. E. 275 (1917), where the court said: "Such a rule is analogous to the doctrine prevailing in many of our state courts, which prevents a party having enjoyed the full benefits of an ultra vires contract from repudiating its burdens";
Vogt Farm Products Co. v. Sherman, 5 D. & C. 6og (Pa. 1924) ; see Teehan
v. U. S., supra note 4, at 885; Cahall v. Lofland, msura note 4, at 317; Finch v.
7

Warrior Cement Corp., 141 AUt. 54, 62 (Del. 1928); (1921)

416-17. But see Southwestern Tank Co. v. Morrow, supranote 4.

30 YALE L.

J.
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the instrument is under seal, is well settled.' While a mere indulgence or
silent acquiescence in the act which constitutes a breach does not amount to
a waiver,' yet if the grantor delays an unreasonable length of time before
asserting his right, knowing that grantee is making valuable improvements on
the property, so that there exist the elements of estoppel, he will be held
to have waived his right to a forfeiture' Such a waiver, moreover, may be
by acts showing an intention to forego the benefits of the condition and inconsistent with the right to enforce the forefeiture.' Upon the ground that
the leasing of the adjoining property for oil drilling manifested such an intention and inconsistency, and only upon this ground, the court in the principal case very properly rests its decision. However, in all but a few states,
the very conveyance by the grantor of his interest in the land, whether
beforeI or afterI breach of the condition, would be held to constitute a waiver,'
notwithstanding and in addition to the fact that such transfer would be
totally inoperative to pass any rights to, the transferee8 This doctrine is an
anomalous hangdver from the medieval "incapacity . . . to conceive that
mere rights can be transferred";!'
or it owes its origin, perhaps, to the old
law of maintenanceP California has by statute made transferable the grantor's interest after breach of the condition,' and similar departures from the
common law rule have been made, by statute or decision, in several other
jurisdictions
Inasmuch as the rule no longer has any justification in reason
and modern law, particularly in its inhibition and penalizing of conveyances
after breach, when there is an actual, vested interest in the grantor, these departures are most commendable.

I Sanitary Dist. v. Chicago Title & T. Co., 278 Il. 529, x16 N. E. 161
(19'7).
'Barnesville v. Stafford, 161 Ga. 588, 131 S. E. 487 (1926); Sanderson
v. Dee, 67 Okla. 72, 168 Pac. xooi (x197) ; Carbon Black Coal Co. v. Murphy,
101 Id. 115 (1885).
'Bredell v. Kerr, 242 Mo. 317, 147 S. W. o5 (1912); Maginnis v.
Knlckerbocker Ice Co., 112 Wis. 385, 88 N. W. 300 (iqOI).
'Terry v. Taylor, 143 Ark. 2o8, 22o S. W. 42 (I2o) ; Ross v. Sanderson,
63 Okla. 73, z62 Pac. ;7og (1917) ; Brown v.. Wrightman, 5 Cal. App. 391, 9o
Pac. 467 (1907).
'Halpin v. School Dist, 224 Mich. 3o8, 194 N. W. 1004 (1g2.3); Wagner v. Wallowa County, 76 Ore. 453, 148 Pam 1140 (1915); Rice v. Boston
W. & R. Corp., 12 Allen 14r (Mass. 1866).
"Peoria Heights v. Keithley, 299 IIl. 427, 132 N. E. 53z (192) ; Craig v.
Franklin County, s8 Me. 495 (i87o); Underhill v. Saratoga Co., 2o Barb.
455 (N. Y. 1855).
7.tbid.
'Wagner v. Wallowa County, sipr note 5; Upington v. Corrigan, 151
N. Y. 143, 45 N. E. 359 (xg96).
'Maitland, Mystery of Seisin (1886) 2 L. Q. Ray. 481, 489.
"Bouvier v. Ry. Co., 67 N. 3. L. 281, 29r, 51 Atl. 781, 783 (igo2).
" CAL. Cirv. CoDin (Deering, 1923) 488 § x046.
Permitting transfer before breach: 2 N. J. Comp. STAT. (191o) 1539 § 19.
Permitting transfer after breach: 2 CoNN. GEN. STxA. (1918) 1433 § 5111;
-Perry v. Smith, 231 S. W. 340 (Tex. 1921); Bouvier v. Ry., supra note xo;
McKissech v. Pickle, 16 Pa. 14o (x8o).
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EASEMENTS-I"MPLED UPON SEVERANCE OF OWNERSHIP OF DOMINANT
AND SERVIENT TENEMENTS-QuAsr EASEMENTS--The owner of several lots

laid a sewer drain entirely on his own property, connecting with the houses
thereon and running adjacent to his house on the corner lot. The owner afterwards conveyed the lots to four differerut parties. Complainant, present owner
of the corner house, discovers that the drain is on his property and brings
a bill to restrain the several respondents from continued trespass in the use
of the drain pipe. Held, that a common owner's deed to a portion of land conveys by implication, rights essential, apparent and continuously necessary to
the beneficial use of the granted property, because of the quasi easement which
existed before severance and the presumed intention of the parties that it be
conveyed. Wiesel et ux.v. Sinira et at., 142 At. 148 (1928).
No easement exists as regards respective properties so long as they are
possessed by a common owner 1 However, where a common owner uses a
portion of his land, known as the quasi servient estate, for the benefit of another
part, known as the quasi dominant estate, a quasi easement is created in favor
of the part benefited.2 Upon severance of the common ownership an easement
may be created by implication of a grant' arising from the pre-existing quasi
easement.' As a general rule, courts will imply such a grant only if the
pre-existing quasi easement was apparent, continuous and reasonably necessary.5
The doctrine of implied grants is generally held to be based upon the presumed
intent of the parties,' or on the ground that a deed is construed most favorably
for the grantee7 A number of courts,' however, are of the opinion that no
such intention in fact exists and that the true basis seems to be a rule of
law, that a grant of property carries with it everything that is reasonably neces'Faas v. Walwork, 96 N. J. Eq. 541 (1924); Robinson v. Hillman, 36
App. Cas. 241 (D. C. 19i1).
I German Savings and Loan Society v. Gordon, 54 Ore. 147, 1o2 Pac. 736
(igog) ; 2 TiFFANY, REAL PRoPERTY (2d ed. i92o) 1272.
'Distinction is made between an implied grant and an implied reservation

of an easement. A grant may be implied when the qzwsi dominant estate is
conveyed while a reservation may be implied when the grantor retains the quasi
dominant estate.
' Cheda v. Bodkin, 173 Cal. 7, i58 Pac. i125 (1916); Brown v. Dickey,

io6 Me. 97, 75 AtI. 38z (igog).
ITaylor v. Wright, 76 N. J. Eq. 121, 79 Atl. 433 (igog) ; Jones v. Bethel,
2o OkIa. App. 422, I52 N. E. 734 (1925). But see :2TIFFANY, REAL PRoPERY
(2d ed. 192o) I273. "It does not seem that the presence or absence of any
or all of these characteristics, should be conclusive." As a general rule
there can be no reservation by implication, unless the easement is one of
strict necessity. Brown v. Fuller, AS Mich. x62, 13o N. W. 621 (i1r) ; Dabney v. Child, 95 Miss. 585, 48 So. 897 (19o9).
'Evans v. Dana, 7 R. I. 3o6 (1862); Robinson v. Hillman, supra note i.
The doctrine of implied reservations also, is generally held to be based on the
presumed intent of the parties. Hoffman v. Shoemaker, 69 W. Va. 233, 7I S.
E. 198 (1911).
'Wilson v. Riggs, 27 App. Cas. 350 (D. C. i9o6) ; Walker v,Clifford, 128
Ala. 67, 29 So. 588 (igoo).
'Conover v. Cade, 184 Ind. 6o4, 112 N. E. 7 (1916) ; Lanier v. Booth, 5o
Miss. 4Io (1871).
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sary for its enjoyment. Another courto held it to be a fiction of law, by which
a grant is implied to meet a special emergency on the ground of public policy.
The latter views seem to be most logical, since courts are more apt to do justice with rules of law than with presumptions. The principal case, therefore,
although consistent with the general view in its decision, nevertheless has done
its share in adding to the existing confusiorf by referring to this fiction or rule
of law as the presumed intention of the parties.

INSUrANCE-DuTY OF INSURER TO USE REAsoABnrCCAm To Epp= Snr-

r.rsmqT-Under an employer's liability insurance policy, the defendant insurance company is given complete control over any claims arising out of in-

juries to the plaintiff's employees with option to settle or defend in court 1
The plaintiff now sues the defendant in tort for negligence in refusing to accept
an offer of settlement for a sum less than the face of the policy, subsequent
to which refusal a judgment was recovered against the plaintiff in excess of
the face of the policy. Held, that the plaintiff cannot recover. Best Bldg.
Co. v. Employers L aiWy Corp., 247 N. Y. 451, i6o N. E. gii. (1928).
The situation presented by this case has resulted in conflicting decisions.
The majority' does not allow recovery, on the theory that no duty is owed by
the insurer to effect a settlement, and hence that there is no breach of duty
upon which liability may be predicated. A small minority' reaches a contrary result on the theories that in the matter of settlement the insurer 'is
the agent of the insured, and secondly, that the contract imposes a duty to
use care to settle. A careful analysis of the situation shows both premises of
the minority to be unsound. Although the insurer may be an agent in defense

of the suit, in the matter of settlement the relationship between the parties is
contractual and not one of agency.'

That this was the intent of the parties

follows from the agreement that the insurer could settle or defend as dictated
by its own and not the insured's interests, i. e., the insurer has reserved thd
right to act but has not undertaken a legal duty to act. The same reasoning
applies to break down the theory- of a duty arising from the contract, for the
'Buss v. Dwyer, =25 Mass.

287 (x878).

'It is interesting to note that this clause reserving to the insurance company the right to settle or to defend, is characteristic of policies of this kind
in the great majority of states. A correct decision therefore is of great importance to this branch of law.
'Auerbach v. Maryland Cas. Co., 236 N. Y. 247, 140 N. E. 577 (1923);
Schmidt v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 244 Pa. 26, go At. 653 (19r4); Wisconsin
Zinc v. Fidelity, 162 Wis. 3g, 155 N. W. ZoBi (1916). For a collection of
cases see Note (1goS) 6 L. R. A. (N. s.) 56.
'Cavanaugh v. General Assurance Corp., 79 N. H. 186, Io6 Adt. 604 (1919);
Douglas v. U. S. Fidelity Co., 8r N. H; 371, 127 At. 708 (1924).

'Wisconsin Zinc v. Fidelity, sipra note i. The failure to recognize this
distinction has caused the minority to impose an agent's duties to his principal
on the insurer in both cases, whereas it should apply only to the relationship between the parties when the insurer undertakes the defense of a suit in behalf
of the insured.
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contract allows the insurer the right to refuse to settle if it will defend the
insured in suit. Since the insurer has the right to refuse to settle, the interpolation by the court of a duty to settle is clearly contrary to the expressed
intent of the parties
JoiNT TExANCY-JOINT BANK DEPosiT-SuRwvvoRsHn---X, the owner of a
sum of money, deposited it in the names of "X or Y," Y not being the wife of X.
The signature card and memorandum accompanying the deposit were under
seal and stated that the sums deposited belonged to the undersigned depositors as joint tenants, and authorized the bank to deal with the survivor
as sole and absolute owner. The plaintiff contended under a Pennsylvania
statute' the right of survivorship, as an incident of joint tenancies, does, not
follow as a matter of law. Held, that the above writing expressed an intention to create a joint tenancy with the right of survivorship, with sufficient
clarity to overcome the statutory presumption. Mardis v. Steen, 293 Pa. x3,
14r Aft. 629 (1928).

"

At common law the right of survivorship existed as an incident of a
joint tenancy.2 Moreover, courts, in early times, in construing conveyances,
favored joint tenancies rather than tenancies in common,' but it was not
long before both courts of law and equity began to regard joint tenancies with
the right of survivorship with disfavor, seeking to establish, instead, tenancies in
common.' Due to the latter-attitude the Pennsylvania statute in question 5
'An interesting decision was rendered by the Kentucky Court in Fire and
Life Ins. Co. v. Louisville Tel. Co., 175 Ky. 96, 193 S. W. 1031 (1917), which

holds that although the contract gives the insurer complete and sole control
over all settlements, yet when the claim is in excess of the face of the policy,
the court will so construe the contract as to give the insured power to settle
because he alone would be liable for such excess.
'Ac op MARCH 31, 1812, 5 Sir. L. 395, PA. ST. (WF-sT, i920) § 12735.
' See (1928) 76 U. Or PA. L. REv. ioo2.
'Doe v. Prestwidge, 4 M. & S. 178, io5 Reprint Soo (x815); Caines v.
Grant, 5 Binn. ii!

(Pa. 1812); Martin v. Smith, 5 Binn. 16 (Pa. 182), de-

daring that at one time the common law favored, by reason of the right of
survivorship, title by joint tenancy. For it thus, as was supposed, tended to
combine or unite the feudal services, consolidate tenures and strengthen the
feudal connection.
'Bombaugh v. Bombaugh, ii S. & R. i9 x (Pa. 1824); Galbraith v
Galbraith, 3 S. & R. 392 (Pa. 187); Caines v. Grant, Martin v. Smith,
both upra note 3; Sturm v. Sawyer, 2 Pa. Super. 254 (1896); McKeever
v. Patteson, 2 Pa. Co. 3o4 (866).
The above cases state in effect that,
since feudal tenures are no longer extant, the reason for the rule favoring joint tenancies has been broken down, and courts of law and equity therefore turn from such a construction.
IAcr OF MARCH 31, 8mz, spra note z: ". . . that if partition be not made
between joint tenants . . . the parts of those who die first shall not accrue
to the survivors, but shall descend or pass by devise, and shall be subject to
debts, charges, courtesy or dower, or transmissable to executors or administrators, and be considered to every other intent and purpose in the same manner
as if such deceased joint tenants had been tenants in common..
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was enacted. The Pennsylvania tribunals' in interpreting this act have held
that, under it, the right of survivorship no longer exists as an incident of
joint tenancies as a matter of law, but that it creates no restriction on the
right of the parties to provide for survivorship by will, deed or agreement,
and thus stipulate that the same rights of succession should continue as theretofore;". e., that the act only raises a rebuttable presumption against strvivorship in such tenancies. We are here furnished with an instance illustrating the acquiescence of the courts in the ability of individuals to dispose of rights conferred under statutes, through the instrumentality of an
express agreement. The Pennsylvania courts are in accord with the general
attitude toward the legal principles on this subject 8 In the princil~al case, the
court, in dealing with this legal presumption, treats the problem as one
wherein the right of survivorship is still lawful, and its existence solely a
question of intent to be determined from a construction of the instrument
creating the joint tenancy? This decision is in accord with a long line of
Pennsylvania. decisions on the subject, although, prior to it, the problem involved was confined to the passage of title to real property,"0 or personal
property where the party claiming the right of survivorship was the wife
or blood relative of the deceased. The survivor of the joint tenant secures
'Bombaugh v.Bombaugh, m.t'ra note 4, at Iy9: "The operation of the
Act on existing estates is not an invasion of vested rights, that is, the right
of survivorship as an incident to joint tenancies. If . . . any joint tenants . . . desired the chance of survivorship, they might have it, by an
agreement for that purpose." Arnold v. Jack's Estate, 24 Pa. 57 (x854) held,
"Though survivorship as an incident to joint tenancy was abolished by the
Act of 812, it may be expressly given by will or deed. . . . It may cease
to exist as an incident and yet legally be created as a principal." Cf. Seely v.
Seely, 44 Pa. 434 (1863); Kennedy's Appeal, 6o Pa. 5ri (z869); Kerr v.
Verner, 66 Pa. 326 (i87o); Yard's Appeal, 86 Pa. 125 (1878); Jones v. Cable,
114 Pa. 586, 7 AU. 79 (1886) ; Redemptorist Fathers v. Lawler, 2o5 Pa. :Z4,
54 At. 487 (1903); It re McCallum, 211 P .2o5, 6o Atl. 903 (19o5).
'Arnold v. Jack's Estate, stpr note 6; Redemptorist Fathers v. Lawler,
stepra note 6, "Survivorship as an incident of an estate granted being still
lawful, its creation becomes a question of intent No particular form of words
is required further than that they shall be sufficient to clearly express an intent in order to overcome the presumption arising from the statute." Cf. It re
McCallum, .mipranote 6; Blick v. Cockins, 252 Pa. 56, 97 At!. r25 (916);
Leach's Estate, 282 Pa. 545, 548, 128 At. 497, 498 (1925); McIntosh's Estate,
289 Pa. 509, 137 Atl. 661 (1927).
"The right to acquire, possess and protect property provided for in the
CONSTITUToN, Art. x, sec. i, includes the right to make reasonable contracts
which shall be under the protection of the law. Cf. Commonwealth v. Brown,
8 Pa. Super. 339 (1898) ; Constitution of the United States, Amend. 14.
'Mardis v. Steen, 293 Pa. 13, 16, 141 AUt. 629, 63o: "In other words,
survivorship, as an incident of an estate held by joint tenants, is still lawful
and the question is now one of intent, and no particular words are necessary
except that the intent be expressed with sufficient clearness to overcome" the
presumption arising from the statute."
'Arnold v. Jack; Redemptorist Fathers v. Lawler; In re McCalIum;
McIntosh's Estate, all supra note 7.
'Blick v. Cockins, sispro note 7 (bank account in names of A and wife
-B); Leach's Estate, .spra note i (brother and sister joint owners of a library
used in partnership historical work).
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title to the property by virtue of the agreement, which becomes effective at the
date of making, and not at the date of tenant's death.n The agreement being
under seal, the court, in accord with the Pennsylvania decisions, gives full
common law effect to ite They then go on to give effect to what they believe
were the intentions of the parties,"' that title to a joint interest in the deposit
pass at the time of making the contract, with a .right of survivorship, entitling
Y to the balance on deposit at time of X's death.
The attitude-of the Pennsylvania courts is undoubtedly sound-because it gives expression, above everything, to the intentions of the contractors, as interpreted by the court

JUDGMENT-PAYMENT or FOREIGN DECREE AS SATIsFAcTIox OF DomESTIc

JU:DGmExT--In 1917 a New York money decree was returned unsatisfied. In
1922 the judgment creditors brought proceedings in a French court to enforce the New York judgment. The French court decreed that the judgment
debtor pay a definite sum in francs, based, at the creditors" request, on the
exchange rate at the date of the French suit. The debtor made payment when
the franc had depreciated in value, so that the creditors received less than the
original New York judgment in dollars. The debtor then moved the New
York court to vacate its judgment and satisfy it of record. Held, that payment in terms of the French decree satisfied the New York judgment. In re
ameds Will, 248 N. Y. z, 161 N. E. 201 (1928).
In the principal case the court is of the opinion that the New York
judgment is completely executed when the French decree is satisfied and that

the immediate problem is one of payment of that French judgment. The
courts have solved that problem by fixing the rate of exchange as of the date
when the cause of action arose,' when suit was brought,2 or when judgment
= Leach's Estate; McIntosh's Estate, both .supra note 7.

Cf. Clymer v. Groff, 2o Pa. 58o, 67 Atl. ng (i9o8).
"'Mardis v. Steen, supra note 9, at I8, 141 AUt. at 63o; Leach's Estate;
McIntosh's Estate, both supra note 12.
'Mardis v. Steen, supr. note 9, at I8, 141 At. at 630.
"In accord with Pennsylvania view see Deal's Admrs. v. Bank, 120 Va.
297, 91 S. E. 135 (1917) (quotes Blick v. Cockins, 252 Pa. 56, 97 At. i 5
(x916) and holds: money deposited by the owner in a bank to the credit of
himself or another belongs, upon his death to the latter and not to his ad-

ministrator) ; West v. McCullough, 123 App. Div. 846, 848, 1o8 N. Y. Supp. 493,

496, aff'd in 194 N. Y. s18, 52o, 87 N. E. 113o, 1131 (1908). See also In re
Bolin, 136 N. Y. 107, 32 N. E. 626 (1892) (Joint tenancies of . . . bank
deposits may be created, if the parties so intend, irrespective of whether the
tenants be husband and wife, and in such case the right of survivorship exists
n."y), despite the presumption that it was done for purDoses of convenience
'Hicks v. Guinness, 269 U. S. 7I, 46 Sup. Ct. 46 (1)25) ; Dante v. Miniggio,
298 Fed. 845 (Ct. of App. D. C. 1924); Simonoff v. Granite City National
Bank, 279 II. 248, ni6 N. E. 636 (1917); Hussey v. Farlow, 91 Mass. 263
(t864); Rasst v. Morris, 135 Md. 243, 104 At. 412 (1919); Kantor v. Aristo
Hosiery Co., 2
App. Div. 5og, 226 N. Y. Supp. 582 (z928).

'Revillon v. Demme, 114 Misc. 1, i85 N. Y. Supp. 443 (igao).
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was given
The principal case accepts the exchange date demanded by the
creditor, which was the date of suit, and asserts that both creditor and
debtor must bear the risk of currency fluctuations.s A strong dissenting
opinion" bases its reasoning on the premise that the French decree is not
a judgment on the merits of the case, but is a form of execution to enforce
the New York judgment which does not merge into the French judgment
Therefore, payment of the French decree does not extinguish the primary
New York obligation' beyond the value of the francs according to the
exchange rate at date of actual payment. While the position of the majority of the court is well taken, inasmuch as the creditor is given the
exchange rate for which he asked, the equities of the general situation are
with the dissent. Under the dissenting view, a wily debtor does not gain by
waiting for a favorable exchange rate, and a debtor can protect himself from
sudden appreciation in the rate of exchange by satisfying the New York
judgment in dollars. Why should a defaulting debtor profit at the expense
of a blameless creditor?"

PARTERsitps-ORAL AGREEMENT To DEAL it; LAND-RELATION TO STAT-

oF FhAuDs-Parties orally agreed to form a partnership for the purchase of real estate, the defendant supplying the necessary cash, the profits
to be equally divided, and the plaintiff to have the right, at any time, to receive
a conveyance of a one-half interest in lands so purchased upon payment of
one-half of the advances made thereon. In this action to dissolve the joint
adventure, to compel the defendant to account, and to compel him also to
execute a deed, the lower court dismissed the complaint on the theory that
the agreement was void under the Statute of Frauds
Held, that the Statute
of Frauds does not apply. Maetikow v'. Sudarsky, 248 N. Y. 404, 162 N. E.
UTE

296 (x928).

The problem whether an oral partnership agreement to deal in lands is
'Liberty National Bank v. Burr, 27o Fed. 25, (E. D. Pa. 1921); The
Hurona, 268 Fed. go (S. D. N. Y. i92o); Benners v. Clemens, 58 Pa.
24 (1868).
'See Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457, 548, 549 (U S. 1870).
'The court was divided 4 to 3. Cardozo, C. J., and Pound and Crane, JJ.,
dissented.
'Lilly Brackett Co. v. Sonnemann, 163 Cal. 632, 126 Pac. 483 (1_12);
Matter of Williams, 208 N. Y. 32, IO N. E. 853 (1913) ; LAWSON, R GHTs,
REMEDIEs
AND PRAcTrcE (i8go)
7

§§258o,

:2581.

Zimmerman v. Sutherland, 274 U. S.253, 47 Sup. Ct 625 (.927).
"See Note (1927) 75 U. OF PA. L. REv. 448, 449.

"'An estate or interest in real property, other than a lease for a term not
exceeding one year, or any trust or power, over or concerning real property,
or in any manner relating thereto, cannot be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared, unless by act or operation of law, or by deed or conveyance
in writing subscribed by the person creating, granting, assigning, surrendering,
.ordeclaring the same, or by his lawful agent, thereunto authorized in writing.'
7 N. Y. AzN. CoNs. LAWS 7437 (2d ed. 1917).
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within the Statute of Frauds has long been a mooted question
The principal case proceeds upon the theory that since a partnership may be formed
by oral agreement, the partnership is valid,' and the fact that -real estate is
purchased by the partnership is only of importance in so far as it affects
the proper relief to be granted in an accounting between partners.' It is
submitted that to adopt such a line of reasoning, based upon this fallacious
premise,' is but to beg the issue, for the very problem is whether or not
such a partnership can. be formed since it amounts indirectly, at least, to an
agreement for "an estate or interest in real property" It would seem that
the defendant's agreement to convey land that he would purchase in the
future, instead of taking the case out of the Statute, would bring it more
clearly and unequivocally within its terms.! The policy of the Statute is not
only to prevent a purchase of land from being forced by perjury and fraud
upon one who never contracted for it, but also to protect owners of land from
being deprived of it without written evidence.' If the proposition advanced
becomes generally applied,8 what safety would there be, in the absolute title
of deeds, when by oral proof that a partnership was formed to deal in land,
and that the particular land transaction came under partnership business, the
Statute could be avoided? Under the circumstances involved the principal
case amounts to a judicial repeal of the Statute of Frauds and is, therefore,
not to be commended. Title to real property should be preserved from the
uncertainty and the fraud attending the admission of oral testimony.
The principal case should be distinguished from those in which a constructive or resulting trust is under consideration, by virtue of the fact that one
of the partners violates his duty in acquiring land in his own name. Bates v.
Babcock, 95 Cal. 479, 3o Pac. 6os (i892) (constructive trust) ; Paige v. Paige,
71 Iowa 318, 32 N. W. 360 (1887) (resulting trust).
'In arriving at such a result the court lines up with the great numerical
weight of authority. Brown v. Spencer, 163 Cal. 589, 126 Pac. 493 (1912);
Chester v. Dickerson, 54 N. Y. 1 (1873); Traphagen v. Burt, 67 N. Y. 30
(1876)- Contra: Smith v. Burnham, 3 Sumner 435 (U. S. C. C. 1838);
McKinley v. Lloyd, r28 Fed. 519 (C. C. D. Ore. 1904); cf. Huntington v.
Burdeau, 149 Wis. 263, 135 N. W. 845 (1912), in which the void contract being
fully executed was considered as not within the Statute of Frauds.
' The same courts have, however, rather uniformly considered that a transaction whereby one party agrees with another to purchase land for their
joint benefit involves the creation of an interest in land. Parsons v. Phelan,
x34 Mass, iog (1882); Mancusso v. Rosso, 81 Neb. 786, 116 N. W. 679
(x08) ; Levy v. Bush, 45 N. Y. 589 (1871).
'From this premise the court reasoned that in adjusting the equities,
property held- by the partnership is regarded as personal property, after
which the holder of the legal title becomes trustee of the remainder, by operation of law, as real estate for the benefit of the persons interested. Such
a trust is saved by § 5o of the Statute of Frauds. Fairchild v. Fairchild,
64 N. Y. 471 (876).
6
Cf. Dunphy v. Ryan, nr6 U. S. 491 (1886).
"BRowxqF, STATUTE OF FRAUDS (Sth ed. 1895) § 263.
aWhen the partnership contract provides for a dividing of profits only,
the courts have said that this involves no conveyance or transfer of an interest in land. Bunnel v. Taintor's Adm., 4 Conn. 568 (183) ; Babcock v. Read,
99 N. Y. 6o9, 1 N. E. 141 (x88s).
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STATUTMS-CONSTRUCTION-CENSORSHM OF TALKNG Pxc'rus-The State
Board of Censors, under a statute giving them authority to examine and approve
films, reels and views," withheld approval of a film because the exhibitor refused
to submit for approval a copy of the language which was to be produced on the
Vitaphone in connection with the picture. Hetd, that such refusal is a proper
exercise of discretion by the Board. In re Vitagraph,Inc., ii D. & C. 45 (Pa.
1928).
A similar position was taken by the Board-in the case of a picture whose
language was to be reproduced on the Movietone Held, that such refusal is
not a proper exercise of discretion by the Board. In re Fox Filin Corp., ii D.

& C. i29 (Pa. 1928).

These two cases, decided in courts of first instance in the same jurisdiction,
-present interesting differences in the construction of a statute which is sought to
be applied to something obviously not within the purview of the legislature when
the statute was enacted.' It is a cardinal canon of construction that where the
meaning is clear and unambiguous the language of a statute must be enforced
according to the obvious meaning of the words employedr,and taken in the sense
in which it was understood at the time the statute was enacted.! A statute cannot be extended to meet a case for which provision has clearly and undoubtedly
not been made7 On the other hand, statutes based on the police power are given
as liberal a construction as possible, in order to carry out the policy of the legislature in protecting the welfare of the community. Yet however manifest
the general policy of the act may be, if the language of the -statute is not coextensive with it there would be no evasion of the statute in doing that which,
IAcr OF MAY 15, i915, P. L. 534, PA. STAT. (WEsT, 1920) § 21120.
'A device which reproduces sounds in the same manner as a phonograph.
The projection machine used to exhibit the picture is timed with the soundproducing machine through the operation of a ihotor common to both machines
which keeps the speed of the two uniform.
*oThe zictone records the sounds directly upon the film in the form of a
series of horizontal lines varying in density with the variations in light at the
time the sound was recorded. The sound is then reproduced in synchronization
with the picture by means of an attachment placed on a standard projecting machine, which by a combination of electrical and mechanical processes, turns the
light variations on the film into sound. For a discussion of the mechanical principles of the Vitaphone and Movietone, see PopuLAR MECHANiCS MAGAZrNE
(Dec. 1928) 938.
'Synchronization
fected until 1926.

of sounds and motion picture; was not commercially per-

"Bate Refrigerating Co. v. Sulzberger, 157 U. S. 1, 37, 15 Sup. Ct 508, .517
(1894) ; Grayson v. Aiman, Inc., 252 Pa. 46r, 97 Atl. 695 (Tq16) ; BLAcK, INTERPRETATION OF LAWS (2d ed. 1911) 51, and cases cited.

6U. S. v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 91 U. S. 72 (1878); Comm. v. Erie &
N. E. R. R. Co., 27 Pa. 339, 353 (1856) ; Comm. v. Wells, i1 Pa. 463, 1 Atl.
310 (1885) ; St John's Military Academy v. Edwards, 143 Wis. 55r, X28 N. W.
13 (1916).
7
CRAm, STATUTE LAW (3d ed. 1923) 69.
' Smith v. People, 5I Colo. 27o, 117 Pac. &2 (19)
N. C. 265, 84 S. E. 340 (1915).

; State v. Lipkin, x69
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although not altogether in accord with the policy, is not prohibited by the language A distinction has been made in the law between writings and vocalization of the writings by mechanical reproduction, 0 and as films are considered as
writings,' it would seem to follow that the Board was exceeding its power, at
least in the case of the Vitaphone ' The Movietone presents a more delicate
question' It would not be as difficult for a court intent on enforcing the police
power to bring this device within the definition of films as used in the act," yet
it cannot be doubted that by the act the public was intended to be protected from
indecent sights rather than sounds
The remedy would seem to lie with the
legislature.
TAxAToiq-]xEmPTiox OF MUNICIPAL WATERWoRxs-The defendant tax
assessors of the town of Scituate returned, as rateable real estate, a reservoir
ownea by the City of Providence situated entirely within the town limits of
Scituate. The city claimed exemption from taxation because of the public purpose for which the property was used, the reservoir being a part of the city
waterworks. Held, that the property was taxable by the town. City of Providence v. Hall et al., 142 At. E56 (R.I.1928).
In the absence of legislation to the contrary, property of- a municipality
used for the public benefit isfree from taxation, whether itbe within or without the territory by which itisowned,' This immunity rests upon the coincidence of public ownership wth pubic use,' and does not depend upon the loca'MAXWELL, INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES (6th ed. ig2o) 218.
' Stern v. Rosey, 17 App. Cas. 562 (D. C. i9o) (victrola records not an

infringement of copyright on songs); this loophole inCopyright Law remedied
by 35 STAT. 1075 (1909), 17 U. S. C. § 1 (1926).
'aEdison v. Lubin, 122 Fed. 24o (C. C. A. 3d, 1903) ; Harper v. Kalem, z69
Fed. 6i (C.C.A. 2d, i9og) ; see Note (1922) 7I U. OF PA.L.REV.58.
Supra, note 2.
Supra,note 3.
""Sec. x. That the word 'film' as used inthis act means what isusually
known as motion picture film."
"Slepra,
note 4. Itcould hardly be contended that the musical score of a
moving picture, as played by an orchestra, was within the control of the Board
so that itmight object to an obscene song that was to be played at each performance. The suppression of such evils was left to the general police power
and other legislative authority. See ACT OF MAY 20, 1913, P.L. 229, § 6,PA.
STAT. (WEST,1920) § 21111.

'Whiting v. Lubec, 121 Me.121, itS Atl. 896 (1922) ; Milford Water Co.
v.Hopkinton, 192 Mass.491, 78 N. E. 451 (igo6) ; City of Rochester v.Rush,
8o N. Y. 302 (88o) ; 2 COOLEY, TAXATION (4th ed. 1924) § 643; 4 DILLON,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (5th ed. i9xi) § 1396; I DESTY, TAXATION (1884)
48; POND, PUBLIC UTILITIES (3d ed. 1925) § 414.
* City of Sommerville v.Wffaltham, 17o Mass. I6o, 48 N. E. io92 (1897);
People v. Board of Assessors, III N. Y. 5o5, i9N. E. 9o (1888) ; Green v.
Hotaling, 44 N. J.L.347 (z882) ; 2 CooLEv, op. cit. supra note i, §642.
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tion of the property,' or whether it is essential to the running of the government.'
It matters not, further, whether the service, in connection with which the property is used, be rendered by the municipality with or without the exaction of a
fee. As has been repeatedly held, failure of profit is not the criterion.' The
principal case adopts a different rule, based upon a "settled policy to closely
scrutinize exemptions from taxation." This rule of construction is unimpeachable per se--exemptions are not to be presumed or loosely inferredZ The difficulty lies in its application to the facts of the instant case. The weight of authority is with the rule that no exemption is needed for any public property held
as such for public use.' The nununity of such property is not therefore to be
looked for in any express statutory provision, but rests upon general principles
of propriety and expediency now too well settled to be brought into question'
The proceeds of one taxation must not be subjected to a secondP It is apparent
that the court in the instant case was guided by the equities involved. Nearly
half of the taxable property of the town would have been removed from the
assessment lists had the court followed the established rule. While it may therefore appear just to allow recovery under the facts, it seems that the better procedure n would be to deny recovery and let relief if necessary come from the legislature in the form of a special assessment levied on the city in favor of the
town, as has been the common practice in many states that follow the majority
ruleO' It might also be observed that the rule of the instant case is retrograde
rather than progressive, as the modem tendency is to extend rather than to limit
the rule of tax immunity as applied to municipal property held for a public purpose'
'Whiting v. Lubec, supra note I; Queen v. Exminister, 12 Ad. & E. i

(1840) ; Town of Hamden v. New Haven, 91 Conn. 589, io At. 1i (1917) ; 2

COOLEY, op. cit. supra note i, § 6432. Contra: Newport v. Unity, 68 N. H. 592,
44 At. 7o4 (1896) ; see I FARNHAM, WATMS & WVATER RIGHTS (1904) 895.
"People v. Board of Assessors, supra note 2; Perth Amboy v. Barker, 74
N. J.L. 127, 65 Atl. 201 (1905) (statute involved) ; PoND, op. cit. supra note i,
§ 418; Note (19o5) x8 HAnv. L. Rxv. 385. Contra: City of Louisville v. Commonwealth, i Duvall 295 (Ky. 1864). The Kentucky rule is commented upon
in (1897) I HARv.L. Rv. 126.
'West Hartford v. Water Commissioners, 44 Conn. 36 (1877).
'Rochester v. Rush, supra note z; People v. Board of Assessors, supra note
a. Contra: Negley v. City of Henderson, 59 S. W. z9 (Ky. 19oo).
72 CooLEY, op. cit. supra note i, § 672; 1 DaSrr, op. cit supra note z,§ ioS.
'City of Sommerville v. Waltham, supra note 2; City of Rochester v. Rush,
supra note 1; ENDLICH, InTF_RPRETATION op STATUTES (I888) § 163; 2 CooLEY,
op. cit. supra note i, § 638.
' DnLoN, MUNICIPAL Coap0ROA'us (1911) § 1396; 1 DsTrY, TAXATrOh
(1884) § 16.
"'West Hartford v. Water Commissioners, supra note 5.
n This is evidenced by the fact that the Kentucky courts, holding that waterworks are not exempt, have met with difficulty on the question of the enforcement of the tax lien. See Louisville Water Co. v. Commonwealth, 89 Ky. 244,
12 S. W. 303 (1889) ; Louisville Water Co. v. Hamilton, 8 Ky. 517 (1883);
Covington v. Highland District, 24 Ky. Law 453, 68 S. W. 669 (xio).
"-For an example of such a statute see I MAss. Gms. LAws (92i) 549.
" See Charles M. Kneler, _unicipal Functionsand the Law of Public Purpose (r928) 76 U. oF PA. L. REV. 824; Note (z9os) x8 HARv. L. REV. 385.
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TIME-SuNDAYS AND NoxTuDIcIAL DAYs--WEEN LAST DAY roiO APPEAL

ON HoLIDAY-Under a statute providing that appeals must be filed within
sixty days, when the sixtieth day falls on a legal holiday, 7eld, that an appeal may
not be filed the following day. Winkel v. Hollander et al., 14 At. 345 (Md.
x928).
When an act is to be performed within a stated period, the general rule is
that in computing the time the first day is to be excluded and the last day included.' However, when the last day falls on Sunday, many specific rules of limited capacity are laid down. When the interpretation of a contract is involved,
it is generally held that the act may be performed on the following Monday; I
but the contrary has been decided When the case arises under a statute, the
general rule is that Sunday must be included in the count, and the act may not
be performed on the following Monday," under the rule that statutes must be
construed strictly, although several cases have permitted the act to be done on
Monday,' and many statutes now so provide The law in two jurisdictions is
curiously to the effect that a statute "excluding" Sunday requires that the act
be done on the preceding Saturday.7 It has been held that when the act is one
which may legally be done on Sunday that day may not be excluded from the
count Many courts hold that if the period of time is less than a week, Sunday
is excludid whether it is an intervening day or the last day of the period0 This
last rule has been applied to contracts," statutes, and constitutional provisions.' Rules of court, it is said, are to be interpreted liberally, and hence when
FL.Ls

'Montague Corp. v. Burton Lumber Co., 136 S. C. 4o, r34 S. E. r47 (925) ;
Homestead Fire Ins. Co. v. Ison, I10 Va. 18, 65 S. E. 463 (19og) ; In re Anttonaen, 293 F. 473 (D. Ore. 1923).
"Avery v. Stewart, 2 Conn. 6g (1816) ; Armstrong v. McGough, 157 Ark.
173, 247 S. W. 790 (1923) ; Penn. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Miller, 16 F. (2d) 13
(C. C. A. 2d, 1926).
I Amis v. Kyle, 2 Yerg. 31 (Tenn. i82o).
'Vailes v. Brown, I6 Colo. 462, 27 Pac. 945 (i8Si) ; American Tobacco Co.
v. Strickling, 88 Md. 5oo, 41 At. io83 (i898) ; Simmons et al. v. Hanne, 5o Fla.
267, 39 So. 77 (19o5).
5
Sommers v. Adelman, go Conn. 713, 99 Atl. 5o (xgi6) ; Spring v. Giefing,
315 Mo. 525, 289 S. W. 825 (I926).
'IND. AN-T. STAT. (Burns, 1926) § 903; ALA. Civ. CoDs (1923) § Z3;
CALIF. Civ. CoDE (Deering, 1923) §§ 7-11.
'Ex parte James, 125 Ala. 119, 28 So. 69 (1899) ; Nickles v. Kendrick, 76
Miss. 334, 24 So. 534 (1898).

'Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Shrader, 89 Tex. 35, 33 S. W.

112

(895).

Craig v. U. S. Health Ins. Co., 80 S. C. 151, 6i S. E. 423 (i9o8) ; State v.
Michel, 52- La. Ann. 936, 27 So. 565 (x9oo) ; see -American Tobacco Co. v.

Strickling, mipra note 4 at 509, 41 At. at ,o86. When the period of time is
greater than a week intervening Sundays and holidays are not excluded in the
count. See Geneva Cooperage Co. v. Brown, 124 Ky. 16, 98 S. W. 279 (xgo6);
Stevenson v. Donnelly, 2r Mass. 163, 1o8 X. E. 926 (1915).
" Craig v. U. S. Health Ins. Co., supra note 9.
"American Tobacco Co. v. Strickling, supra note 4.
' State v. Michel, .rpra note 9.
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a rule states that an act be done within a specified time and the last day occurs on
Sunday, the act may be performed the following day." Holidays are to be
classed as Sundays only when a statute provides for the general suspension of
business on that day?' The principal case is in accord with the rule that Sundays and legal holidays are not to be excluded from the count when a statute is
involved except when the legislature specifically so provide. However, it is
believed unfortunate, due to the great practical importance of rules of this nature,
that the courts have not been able to adopt a rule of general applicability.

TRILAL-ADDITioNALR
INsTRuc
IoNsrn AusENCE OF Cou szrL-In a trial for
murder, while the jury were deliberating, the court sent to them additional instructions which they had requested. Neither defendant nor his counsel were
present at the time. Held, that this is not reversible error. Commonwealth v.
Kelly, 292 Pa. 418, 141 Atl. 246 (1928).
For a period of many years there has been a striking uniformity of decision
in practically all the states, that it is a fatal error in a criminal cause for a trial
judge to hold private communications with the jury concerning the case submitted for their determination
These decisions have been based on the ground
that the accused has a constitutional right to be present during the trial,' or has
11See Vohlers v. Stafford Mfg. Co., 171 Mich. 8, 137 N. W. .28 (1912) and
cases there cited.
vPage
. Shainwald, 169 N. Y. 246, 62 N. E. 356 (19o).
1
Johnson v. State, oo Ala. 55, 14 So. 627 (1893) ; Stroape v. State, 72 Ark.
379, 80 S. W. 749 (1904); Wilson v. State, 87 Ga. 583, 13 S. E. 566 (i89i);
Roberts v. State, III Ind. 340, 12 N. E. Soo (1887) ; Kirk v. State, 14 Ohio SIr
(I846); Maurer v. People, 43 N. Y. 1, 17 N.. Y. Supp. 25 (i87o); State v.
Kiefer, 16 S. D. 178, 92 N. W. 1117 (rgo2), commented on in (19o3) 51 Am.
L. REG. 97; I BLAsHFmELD, INSTRUCTIONS TO JURMs (2d ed. 1916) pars. 224-225.
Contra: State v. Olds, io6 Iowa 210, 76 N. W. 64 (2898); State v. Pike, 65
Me. iz (1876). The rigid rule laid down here extends not only to criminal
cases, but has leen almost universally applied to civil cases as well. Notable
among these are: Feibeman v. Fire Assurance Co., io8 Ala. i8o, I9 So. 540
(i8g5) ; Sargent v. Roberts, I8 Mass. 337 (2823) ; Bank v. Mix, 5z N. Y. 558,
23 N. Y. Supp. 283 (1873) ; Fillippon v. Slate Co., 250 U. S. 76, 39 Sup. Ct 435
(2929). Contra: Shapley v. White, 6 N. H. 172 (833) (N. H. holds not reversible error if additional instructions are on question of law) ; Goldsmith v. Solomons, 2 Strobh. L. 296 (S. C. 1847) (S. C. holds that the proper administration
of justice is within the direction of the court).
ICommonwealth v. House, 6 Pa. Super. 92 (1897). The court here
quoted the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1873, Declaration of Rights, article z,
section 9: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused hath a right to be heard
by himself and his counsel . . .," and then went on to say "and by fair implication it secures the right to be present . . . when the jury are being instructed. . . !' In Stewart v. Commonwealth, 117 Pa. 378, 11 AtI. 370 (1887),
the court said "the right to be heard is expressly provided for in the constitution
of the commonwealth. . . . The constitution is the law paramount which
binds all the departments of the government." Practically all the state constitutions grant the accused the right to be heard, similarly to the Pennsylvania
Constitution.
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been given that right by statute? The principal case has established precedent
in Pennsylvania in holding that a procedural error in the course of the trial will
not be ground for reversal unless the defendant's case has been unfavorably
prejudiced.' The Pennsylvania court does this on the practical ground that it
would be super-technical and hindering the administration of justice in reversing the conviction because of an unprejudicia error in procedure when the
appellate court in reviewing the evidence sees that the conviction is obviously
correct 5 The court in the principal case adopts the modern rule, that where a
criminal prosecution has ended in a conviction, and the evidence sustains the
verdict, even'wliere an error in practice has occurred, an appellate court should
not reverse unless it "feels not simply that the mistake in question possibly influenced the jury against the defendant, but also that it is strongly probable the
verdict rendered reflects such adverse influence." It would seem that though
Pennsylvania in holding thus is in the numerical minority, yet this is much the
better rule from the viewpoint of the practical administration of justice.7

WILLS-PAROL PaOOF OF A WiL.-REvocATOn AND ITS *E _-cr-The defendant was granted letters of administration on a presumption of the deceased's intestacy. The plaintiff sues to have them revoked, seeking probate of
an i89i will which had been in his possession and which makes him executor.
At the trial the defendant proved the execution of a missing x925 will, and
over the plaintiff's objection, produced evidence including declarations of the
deceased made after that date to prove that it contained a clause revoking
all prior wills. Held, that the admission of such evidence was proper. Barkwell
v. Barkuell [1928 ] P. 91.
'Roberts v. State, supra note i. The statute in Indiana provides in
1
x786,
R. S. i8i, that "no person prosecuted for any offence punishable by
death, or by confinement in the State prison or county jail, shall be tried unless
personally present during the trial."
'The principal case overrules Commonwealth v. House, sitpre note 2, the
only other Pennsylvania criminal case in which this particular point arose.
Here, in holding reversible error, the court said that we cannot deprive the
accused of his right to be present during trial; "Nor can the court's action
in doing so (however well intended and however free from arbitrariness) he
justified by balancing probabilities as to the injury done to him in the particular case." Pennsylvania upholds the same rule in civil cases as in the
principal case. Allegro v. Ins. Co., 268 Pa. 333, 112 Atl. r40 (I92o), aff'g
Cunningham v. Patton, 6 Pa. 355 (1847); cf. Sommer v. Huber, x83 Pa.
162, 38 Atl. 595 (1897) (held reversible error because the judge and the jury disagreed as to the nature and effect of the additional instructions).
'Commonwealth v. Kelly, 292 Pa. 418, 42r, 141 Ad. 246, 247 (1928). The
Pennsylvania court in holding this way is not denying the defendant any of
his constitutional rights, but is merely construing article I, section 9, of the
State Conistitution literally.
'Commonwealth v. Kelly, supra- note s, 42r, 141 At. - -17; Commonwealth v. Dilsworth, 289 Pa. 498, 5o8, r37 Atl. 683, 686 (1g27); Commonwealth v. Marshall, 287 Pa. 512, 524, 135 Adt. 3oI, 3o5 (1926); Commonwealth v. Daily (No. 2), 280 Pa. 59, 65, 124 At. 44o, 44z (I92-4).

"Lehman, Criticism of Criminal Triai Procedure (igis) 63 U. OF PA. L.
Rav. 609, 621, 627.
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Where a deceased is known to have made a will which was last seen in
his possession, and such will cannot be found after his death, it is presumed
that he revoked it animw revocandi Though not admissible to probate, a
revoked will is yet admissible in evidence 2 where relevant, as in the instant
case.3 Formal execution of the will must first be established.' Then its
contents may be proved by parol evidence, i. e., by copy,' eye witnesses,6 and
declarations of the testator. Such declarations inade before the execution of
the will are almost everywhere admissible," but those made after execution are
barred in some jurisdictions by the hearsay rtle.8 But the more modern and
better view, supported by the instant case, admits such post-testamentary declarations, at least in corroboration of other testimony.' A problem not fully disILillie v. Lillie, 3 Hagg. Ecc. 184 (1829) ; In re Kennedy, 167 N. Y. 163,
6o N. E. 44 (igoi) ; Foster's Appeal, 87 Pa. 67 (1878). No such presumption arises where the will was last seen in the custody of another. Schultz
v. Schultz, 35 N. Y. 653 (1866).
21n the principal case plaintiff relied upon an unsupported quotation from
WIL-aTTs, Ei-XECUTORS

(i1th ed. 1921) 258, to show that a revoked will was

totally non-existent even for purposes of evidence. The court, at 99, rejected
this theory in favor of the correct principle laid down in In the Goods of
Hodgkinson, [1893] P. 339.
* In its decision, at 98, the court points out the relevancy of revoked wills
to prove revocation of previous wills, as in the instant case; to show testators
knowledge of specific facts; and to show what part of an earlier partially revoked will is left in effect.
'McMurtrey v. Kopke, 250 S. W. 399 (Mo. 1923).
'Tarbell v. Forbes, 177 Mass. z38, 58 N. E. 873 (i9oo); Coddington v.
Jenner, 57 N. J. Eq. 528, 41 At. 874 (x898). A copy is not admissible in the
absence of evidence to explain how and by whom it was made and to show
that it was a true copy. Hottenstein v. Hottenstein, 191 Ind. 460, 133 N. E.
489 (1922). Since the highest degree of evidence available must be produced,
where a copy is known to be in existence, no oral testimony may be admitted
until the copy is produced or its absence explained. Illinois Land & Loan Co.
v. Bonner, 75 Ill. 315 (874).
Melhase v. Melhase, 87 Ore. 590, 171 Pac. 216 (1918); Glockner v.
Glockner, 263 Pa. 393, io6 Ad. 731 (191g). At common law, one witness who
had read the will was sufficient to prove its contents, but many statutes now
require two witnesses. See WIGmaoRE, EVIDENCE (1923) § 2052.
7
Keen v. Keen, L. R. 3 P. & D. i07 (1873) ; State v. Ready, 78 N. J. L.
599, 75 At. 564 (91o).
Declarations of this type are admitted under an acknowledged exception to the hearsay rule on the ground that they indicate a
design or plan on the part of the testator as to the tenor of his will which
makes it probable that a will of such tenor was executed. Contra: Throckmorton v. Holt, io U. S. 552, 21 Sup. Ct 474 (IgO9), decided by a divided
court, the majority being motivated by the desire to make anti- conform to
post-testamentary statements in rule.
"Quick v. Quick, 3 Sw. & Tr. 442 (x864), overruled by Sugdea v. Lord
St. Leonards, i P. D. 154 (1876); partly dissenting opinion of Mellish, J.,
in Sugden v. Lord St. Leonards, ibid. at 249; Gordon's Will, 5o N. J. Eq.
397, 26 AUt. 268 (1892) ; Throckmorton v. Holt, mpra note 7.
'lost-testamentary declarations are admitted under two different theories.
One brings them under that exception to the hearsay rule which admits evidence
circumstantially indicating a belief in the subject's mind from which belief the
-doing of a previous act may be inferred. Opinion of Hannen, J., in Sugden
v. Lord St Leonards, snpra note 8, at 175; Lappe v. Gfeller, 211 Pa. 462,
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cussed in the principal case because of present settled English law, was whether
the revocation of the 1925 will "revived" that of i891.10 In those American
jurisdictions which follow the English common law view, a will and a revocation contained in it are ambulatory and ineffective until death. Thus, where
the revocatory will is itself revoked before death, it never takes effect and the
first will never having been revoked, is effective, regardless of the testator's
intent. = Other American jurisdictions follow the eccieciastical rule that revival depends entirely upon the intent of the testator, with no presumption either
wayY Both rules were abolished in England by the Wills Act of x837,"
which provides that no revoked will may be revived except by express reexecution or republication, and under which a written revocation is regarded as
effective at the moment it is executed. Many American courts follow this
commendable rule under similar statutes or even in the absence of such
specific provisions '
6o Afd. 1049 (19o5). The difficulty with this theory is that testator's statements
are often intended to mislead avaricious relatives and consequently furnish no
safe guide from which his state of mind may be inferred. What is perhaps
a better theory frankly admits that such declarations are not covered by any
recognized exception to the hearsay rule, and creates one to fill the gap.
Opinions of Cockburn, C. J., and Jesse], M. R., in Sugden v. Lord St.
Le~nards, supra note 8, at 217, at 231; McDonald v. McDonald, 142 Ind. 55,
41 N. "E. 336 (1895); Lane v. Hill, 68 N. H. 275, 44 AtU. 393 (1895).
Whatever its basis in theory, it seems desirable that testators declarations be
admitted, so as to approximate their wishes more closely and to prevent the
triumph of heirt who have fraudulently destroyed unfavorable wills.
"See PAGe, Wuiz (2d ed. 1926) §§ 442-447 and cases cited there; and
Roberts, The Revival of a. Priorby the Revocation of a Late2 Will. (19oo) 48
U. OF PA. L. Rv. 5o5.
'Goodright v. Glazier, 4 Burr. 2512 (177o) ; Pecls Appeal, So Conn.
562 (1883); In re Diamentes Estate, 84 N. J. Eq. 135, 92 At. 952 (1914);
Flintham v. Bradford, io Pa. 82 (1848).
' Kirkcudbright v. Kirkcudbright, i Hagg. Ecc. 325 (1828); Pickens v.
Davis, 134 Mass. 252 (1883) ; In re Moore's Will, 72 N. J. Eq. 371, 65 At.
447 (907).
Under the ecclesiastical rule the will and revocation are regarded as effective immediately upon execution.
"7 WX. IV & X Vicr. c. 26, § 22 (1837).
" Osburn v. Rochester Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 209 N. Y. 54, zoa
N. E. 571 (1913) ; Collins v. Collins, rio Ohio St. 105, 143 N. E. 561 (r924).
Some courts have held that where the later will specifically revoked the first
one, its later revocation does not revalidate the earlier on, but where the
later will revoked the earlier merely by its inconsistent provisions, its later
revocation leaves the earlier will in effect. Cheever v. North, io6 Mich. 390,
64 N. W. 455(1895) ; Johnston's Will, 69 Hun 157, 23 N. Y. Supp. 355 (1893).

